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Part Six - The Freedom of the Citizen and Internal and External Security

American military "aid" and its price

Due to the constant strengthening of the Israeli economy, coupled with the decline in the value of the US dollar, the annual US aid, which many Israelis are accustomed to thinking of as "essential for our existence," was equal in 2014 to only one percent (1.0%) of Israel's GDP[27]. In other words, this is an amount that Israel can certainly manage without.

In the War of Independence, Israel fought under the ban on the sale of American weapons. Until the Six-Day War there was virtually no American aid and weapons[28]. The close ties and the Americanization of the IDF were created only after the overwhelming victory of the IDF in the Six-Day War, which changed Israel's strategic position and made the investment worthwhile for the Americans.

And since then we mostly lose. With the perspective of fifty years of Americanization of the IDF, the cost/benefit calculation raises the question of the feasibility of the process. Already in the Yom Kippur War, shortly after the start of the process, the American weaponry became a means of pressure that prevented Israel from achieving the fruits of complete victory, after the IDF encircled and was about to destroy half of the Egyptian army (the Third Army)[29].

The Lavi aircraft project, which was canceled when the plane was already flying, the Falcon control plane project, American involvement in the funding of Israeli military research and development, restrictions on the IDF's use of American weapons, the restriction of Israeli arms exports and interference in the Israeli decision-making process – all these have become millstones around the neck of the Israeli security establishment. We do receive a "gift," but its true price, in money, freedom of military action, innovation, and freedom of thought, and ultimately in casualties, is far greater.

The American arms industry does not supply its products only to Israel. It sells, and much more, to the Arab countries around us and the rest of the world. Only about a sixth of the American weapons coming to the Middle East come to Israel. If Israel could have the United States no longer supply arms to the Middle East, neither to us nor to our neighbors, it would be the greatest help the United States could give us.

Israel is a special client, whose choice of a weapon system attests to its quality. All the armies of the world want what we have, and therefore the American interest in supplying arms to Israel is both economic and marketing. But the American interest in selling arms to Israel is much greater. The Americans know that what we can not buy from them, we will develop ourselves, at a higher quality, and at a lower cost, thus creating a process that will put Israel at the head of the development of military technology in another area[30] and compete with the American military industry.

Therefore, and not only from the economic point of view, the Americans have a clear interest in creating an Israeli dependence on American arms and funding, while Israel has an opposite interest. Israel must diversify its sources of weapons, in particular by preferring weapons of Israeli development, blue and white, which are also best suited to the unique needs of the IDF.

American "aid" to Israel is now an American interest, not an Israeli one. This is unhealthy money, a method that creates security and political dependence, harms security, damages the economy, and encourages corruption[31].


[27] In September 2016, a ten-year agreement was signed whereby annual aid, in dollars, will increase by 10% compared to the annual aid in the past decade. This nominal increase is negligible in relation to the combination of Israel's GDP growth rate on the one hand and the decline in the value of the dollar on the other. It is reasonable to assume that with the continued growth of the Israeli economy, the relative size of US aid will continue to decline until it constitutes less than one percent of our GDP.

[28] Until 1962, the US refused to sell arms to Israel, and in 1962 the US agreed to sell us only defensive weapons, anti-aircraft missiles, and simultaneously sold identical missiles to a neighboring enemy state. In 1966, the US agreed to sell fighter jets to Israel, but only limited-attack aircraft. These planes were also delivered to Israel only after the main combat systems were removed, while the US sold high-performance fighter jets to a neighboring enemy state. Only in 1969, after Israel won the Six-Day War, and after Israel transferred an intelligence "treasure"to the US, a modern Soviet fighter jet, did the United States agree to sell advanced Phantom jets to Israel. In other words, our "ally" has not always been one.

[29] The American arms supply to Israel served as a means of pressuring Israel even before the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War (as a factor in the government's decision to refrain from attacking first), even during the course of the war (refraining from providing urgent weapons to Israel during a number of days of severe fighting), at its end (When Israel refrained from destruing the half of the Egyptian army which was completely surrounded by the IDF), and afterwards (when the IDF sought to acquire a large amount of American weapons after the war, while Israel negotiated permanent cease-fire and separation of forces arrangements with enemy states defeated in the war). All of these carried a heavy price in Israeli casualties.

[30] Israel's most prominent military developments over the years have been the result of an inability to equip itself with foreign-made weapons, whether because of a refusal to sell arms to Israel or because of our unique security needs. The supply of foreign-made weapons, where it is not necessary, hinders the development of our arms industry, both in terms of the optimal supply of the needs of the IDF, and the increase in defense exports.

[31] The purchase of the F-35 by the State of Israel, which clearly illustrates all the arguments in this chapter, is discussed in detail in the Appendix "Purchase of the F-35 as an Example".

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